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A STUDY IN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
WORD-OMISSION EX INDUSTRIA
By HowARD NwcomiXB MOiSE*
The Constitution of the United States enumerates, in their
order, nine distinct and separate classes of national judicial
jurisdiction,' which are as follows
1. "all cases in law or equity, arising under this constitution,
the laws of the United States, and the treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority;"
2. "all cases affecting ambassadors, other public minsters and
consuls, "
3. "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,"
4. "controversies to which the United States shall be a
party, "
5. "controversies between two or more states,"
6. (controversies) "between a state and citizens of another
state, ''
7 (controversies) "between citizens of different states,"
8. (controversies) "between citizens of the same state, claim-
ing lands under the grants of different states,"
9. (controversies) "between a state or the citizens thereof,
and foreign states, citizens, or subjects."
Mr. Justice Story contended in 1816 in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee2 that because the word "all" was omitted after the first
three the Constitution had conferred all of the first three on the
national judiciary but had designated the Congress as the arbiter
as to whether any, all, or just how much of the latter six should
be conferred on the national judiciary He buttressed his reason-
ing'with the observation that if the word "all" preceded no. 4
the argument might be advanced that the United States could
properly be made a party defendant without her consent in her
own courts. I submit that the reason Mr. Justice Story claimed
- LL.B., Tulane Umversity. Professor of Law, The John Marshall
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'U.S. Const., Art. III, sec. 2, clause I.
1 Wheat. 304, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816)
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that all of the first three have to be exercised was no doubt be-
cause only no. 2 of the first three constitutes original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court, therefore, if two grounds of appel-
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court have to be exercised,
there has to be an inferior national court (or courts) to winch
the original jurisdiction of the two grounds may attach-thus,
the establishment of inferior national courts is justifiably em-
bedded in logic.
One hundred six years later Mr. Justice Sutherland as-
serted in Kline v Burke Construction Company3 that only the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is fixed and immun-
table, completely independent of the Congress. Therefore, fol-
lowing his premise, all of no. 2 has to be exercised by the Su-
preme Court as it alone among the first three constitutes origi-
nal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and part or all of nos.
5, 6, and 9 have to be exercised by the Supreme Court as these
comprise the remainder of the original jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court. Reasoning thusly, no appellate jurisdiction has
to be exercised by the Supreme Court, and accordingly, no in-
ferior national courts have to be created due to the phrase "with
such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress
shall make" following the sentence "In all the other cases before
mentioned (nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8) the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact."'4
Eleven years later Mr. Justice Sutherland was confronted
agam with this problem in Williams v United States.5 This time
he apparently modified his prior view and concurred -with the
conclusion drawn by Mr. Justice Story one hundred seventeen
years earlier, even advancing the same observation winch Mr.
Justice Story had employed regarding the omission of the word
"'all" before no. 4 as indication that the United States could not
properly be made a party defendant without her consent in her
own courts. Mr. Justice Sutherland offered the additional ob-
servation that the word "all" was omitted before no. 6 as indi-
cation that a State could not properly be made a party defend-
ant without her consent by a citizen of another State.
'260 U.S. 226, 67 L.Ed. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. 79, 24 A.L.R. 1077 (1922).
"U.S. Const., Art. III, sec. 2, clause 2.
'289 U.S. 553, 77 L.Ed. 1372, 53 Sup. Ct. 751 (1932).
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Ten years later, however, the problem posed itself again-
for the fourth and last time-n Lockerty v. Phillips.6 In this
case Mr. Chief Justice Stone reverted to the earlier ruling of
Mr. Justice Sutherland and adopted the holding of Kline v.
Burke Construction Company" to the effect that no inferior na-
tional courts have to be created. This conception of the matter
is the law of the land today, but is precedent of only five years
dignity
That the Supreme Court in its seriatim opinion by Mr.
Chief Justice Jay, Mr. Justice Blair, Mr. Justice Wilson, Mr.
Justice Cushing, and Mr. Justice Iredell, the latter dissenting,
did not take the view in Chisholm v. Georgia8 that a State could
not properly be made a party defendant without her consent by
a citizen of another State can only be attributed to the fact that
Mr. Justice Story's opinion in Martin v Hunter's Lessee9 was
not handed down until twenty-three years later, and Mr. Justice
Story was apparently the first jurist to attach importance to the
omission of the word "all" after the first three classes of na-
tional judicial jurisdiction. Since Mr. Justice Iredell alone took
such view in Chsholm v. GeorgiaiO he, accordingly, maght be
expected to have preceded Mr. Justice Story in attaching sigm-
ficance to such word-omission.
o 319 U.S. 182, 87 L.Ed. 1339, 63 Sup. Ct. 1019 (1942).
7 Supra, note 3.
8 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793).
9 Supra, note 2.' Supra, note 8.
